Zilliqa pioneered blockchain sharding in 2019 and adopted EC-Schnorr over secp256k1 — a genuine classical upgrade from ECDSA. But Schnorr on secp256k1 is just as broken by Shor's algorithm as ECDSA. Seven years of DS Committee signatures and ZIL transactions sit in the HNDL archive. BMIC ships NIST FIPS 203/204/205 from day one.
Get BMIC — Quantum-Safe from Day One →| Criterion | BMIC | Zilliqa (ZIL) |
|---|---|---|
| Signature scheme | ML-DSA (FIPS 204 / Dilithium) | Schnorr on secp256k1 (EC-Schnorr / BN-Schnorr) |
| NIST FIPS PQC standard | FIPS 203 + 204 + 205 ✅ | None ❌ |
| Quantum threat | None (lattice-based, no ECDLP) | Critical — Schnorr on secp256k1 still relies on ECDLP; Shor's algorithm applies identically |
| HNDL archive since | N/A (PQC) | January 2019 (mainnet) — 7+ years |
| Sharding model | ERC-4337 / Ethereum | Network Sharding — DS Committee keys published on-chain |
| DS Committee key exposure | Not applicable | Directory Service Committee member Schnorr keys broadcast on-chain every epoch |
| Post-quantum roadmap | Deployed at launch | No published PQC migration plan as of Oct 2026 |
| TGE / Presale | Presale LIVE → TGE Q4 2026 | Live since 2019 |
Zilliqa uses EC-Schnorr signatures over secp256k1 — the same elliptic curve used by Bitcoin and Ethereum. Schnorr is a significant improvement over ECDSA for classical security: it enables key and signature aggregation, eliminates nonce-reuse vulnerabilities, and is more compact. These advantages are completely irrelevant against a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC).
Shor's algorithm recovers the elliptic-curve discrete-logarithm: given a public key Q and generator G on secp256k1, it recovers the private scalar k such that Q = k·G. This applies to all signature schemes built on secp256k1 — ECDSA, Schnorr, EdDSA variants — because the quantum target is the algebraic structure of the elliptic-curve group, not the signing protocol layered on top of it.
Zilliqa uses a three-layer sharding design with a Directory Service (DS) Committee coordinating shard assignments. DS Committee members sign DS blocks with their secp256k1 Schnorr keys, which are published on-chain in each DS block header. A CRQC adversary can recover DS Committee member private keys from this archived data and forge valid DS block signatures — enabling manipulation of shard assignments and cross-shard transaction routing.
Zilliqa mainnet launched in January 2019. Every ZIL transfer, every smart contract invocation, every DS block and TX block has produced Schnorr signatures that are permanently archived. Adversaries following a Harvest Now Decrypt Later strategy have had 7+ years to accumulate this data. Unlike newer chains, Zilliqa has had no architectural shift that would invalidate this archive.
Zilliqa uses Scilla, a functional smart contract language with formal verification properties. Scilla's design reduces certain classical reentrancy vulnerabilities — but has no bearing on the secp256k1 quantum exposure. A CRQC adversary who recovers the admin or multisig Schnorr keys of a Scilla contract can authorise arbitrary state transitions that the blockchain accepts as valid — regardless of Scilla's formal properties.
Module Lattice Key Encapsulation. Lattice-based — no elliptic-curve structure. No known quantum attack.
Module Lattice Digital Signature. Replaces secp256k1 Schnorr/ECDSA. Security based on MLWE — no ECDLP.
Stateless Hash-Based Signature. Hash-function-only security. Backup assurance layer.
No. Zilliqa uses EC-Schnorr on secp256k1 — an elliptic-curve scheme broken by Shor's algorithm on a CRQC. Schnorr is a classical improvement over ECDSA but provides no quantum resistance. No NIST-aligned post-quantum primitive has been deployed to Zilliqa mainnet as of October 2026.
No. Both Schnorr (secp256k1) and ECDSA (secp256k1) rely on ECDLP — the same mathematical structure Shor's algorithm breaks. Schnorr's classical advantages (aggregation, no nonce reuse) are irrelevant against a CRQC. The quantum threat is identical.
BMIC implements NIST FIPS 203/204/205 — lattice and hash-based primitives with no known quantum attack — from day one. Zilliqa deploys EC-Schnorr secp256k1, which Shor's algorithm breaks. Visit bmic.ai for current presale details. DYOR.